Medical Malpractice

Cap on Noneconomic Damages Inapplicable to Wrongful Death Actions

As originally enacted, the medical malpractice cap on non-economic damages (MCLA § 600.1483) contained a specific exception for wrongful death actions. Although the exception was removed when the statute was amended in 1993, the Michigan Court of Appeals has held that the cap remains inapplicable to actions for wrongful death. Jenkins v. Patel, Michigan Court of Appeals docket number 233116 (decided April 1, 2003). For the most part, the Court based its ruling on the Wrongful Death Act's broad description of recoverable damages, and the lack of any language in § 600.1483 specifically limiting wrongful death damages.

After examining the broad language of the Wrongful Death Act, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Wrongful Death Act "mandates recovery in any amount, limited only to the degree that the amount be fair and equitable, for non-economic losses, including those for loss of society and companionship." Turning to the language of § 600.1483, on the other hand, the Court noted that the statute does not specifically mention the type of damages ordinarily sought in a wrongful death action (e.g., loss of society and companionship). Although § 600.1483 defines non-economic loss as "damages or loss due to pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, physical disfigurement, or other non-economic loss," the Court held that this definition was not sufficiently broad to encompass damages resulting from wrongful death. Since the Wrongful Death Act is a long established statute, the Court held that "it was incumbent on the part of the Legislature to include some language in [§ 600.1483] to specifically indicate its intent that the damages cap applied in wrongful death actions in order to avoid any conflict." According to the Court of Appeals, "the failure to so indicate can only reasonably lead to the conclusion that the legislative intent was to exclude wrongful death actions from being subject to the ceilings contained in [§ 600.1483], especially where no change was simultaneously made to the [Wrongful Death Act] to reflect a limit on damages."

The Court also noted the general rule that where there is a conflict between two statutes, one of which is specific to the subject matter, while the other is only generally applicable, the specific one must prevail. The Court held that the Wrongful Death Act is the more specific statute in this context, because "it more specifically denotes the type of damages at issue to be considered by the trier of fact." For this additional reason, the Court concluded that the medical malpractice damage cap is inapplicable to wrongful death actions.

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